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A concordat is an agreement between the 
church authorities and the state that regulates 
the activities of the former on the territory of 
the latter. Since both European Defence and 
the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with 
their zealous high priests and devoted 
believers, the term seems apt enough for the 
EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this 
paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the 
EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and 
NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put 
to use to mend the schism between them. Can 
a miracle be worked?  
 
An EU-NATO package deal would not change 
either’s authority. But it would recognise that one 
can voluntarily refrain from exercising one’s 
authority in areas where the other delivers more. 
The well-established military principle of 
“supporting and supported” organisations 
should apply, as Thierry Tardy also advocates:1  
where the concordat puts NATO in the lead, the 
EU limits itself to supporting it, and vice versa. A 
concordat would thus be a practical division of 
responsibility, which can be pragmatically revised 
over time, as the strategies and capabilities of 
both organisations’ member states evolve. The 
aim is to ensure that everything is done by the one 
who does it best, nothing is done twice, and 
nothing is left undone – unlike the current state 
of affairs, in spite of all pledges, binding 
commitments, and joint declarations.  
 
My proposed package deal is composed of a 
trinity: the Father, the original task of territorial 
defence and resilience; the Son, the late offspring 
of expeditionary operations; and the Holy Spirit 
that animates it all, defence planning and 
capability development.  
 
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE  
The primary task of the armed forces remains the 
defence of the Holy Land: collective territorial 
defence.  
 
There is a widespread perception that deterrence 
and defence are credible only because the US has 
the will and the forces to act, and can cajole its 
allies into action. Consequently, hints that the 
aspiration to EU strategic autonomy stretches 
into territorial defence antagonise many who fear 
that this might undermine the US’ commitment 
 
 





to NATO’s Article 5, while they don’t trust their 
fellow Europeans to defend them instead. This 
has created a strange paradox: Europeans feel 
weak and reliant on the US; therefore they shrink 
back from any initiative that might upset 
Washington; and so they remain forever weak 
and reliant on the US. American policy tends to 
reinforce rather than break this cycle: the US 
continually exhorts its European Allies to do 
more, yet pushes back the moment it feels any 
European initiative could lead to heresy and 
threaten its leadership (or its arms exports).  
 
Europe’s ingrained subservience anyhow rests on a 
somewhat distorted version of history, in which the 
US rushed to aid the European democracies 
whenever they were threatened. The reality is that in 
1914 and again in 1939 Britain and France went to 
war to aid Belgium and Poland whereas, as Field 
Marshal Montgomery (NATO’s first Deputy 
SACEUR) wrote: “In two world wars Europe has 
seen the United States watching from the touchline 
during the first two years of the war; the European 
nations do not want this to happen again”.2 Unlike 
during the Cold War that followed the two world 
wars, for the US today Europe is the secondary 
theatre to Asia. US defence planning has moved to a 
“one-war standard”, aimed at defeating one great 
power: China.3  Europeans must take into account, 
therefore, that if the US was engaged in a major 
contingency in Asia, American reinforcements in 
case of a simultaneous crisis in Europe might arrive 
later and in smaller numbers than hitherto foreseen.  
 
US commitment may decline in any case if Donald 
Trump, another Trump, or any Trumpist wins the 
US presidential elections in 2024. Trump won 74 
million votes in 2020, and the Republican Party 
seemingly remains in awe of him, in spite of the 
storming of the Capitol that he incited on 6 January 
2021. Trumpism and the isolationist and anti-EU 
sentiments that it stands for cannot be discounted, 
therefore.  
At the same time, many also underestimate 
Europe’s capacity to defend itself against 
conventional attack. During the Cold War, 
Western European forces could not match the 
massive conventional power of the Warsaw Pact. 
Today however, Barry Posen argues that 
Europeans alone, with their current forces, could 
fight a Russian conventional invasion to a 
standstill and hold a line until American and 
Canadian reinforcements arrived.4 A line in 
Poland, though, not at the border of the Baltic 
states – but who could hold the line there, given 
their exposed geopolitical position? (Not unlike 
that of the Netherlands in 1940).  
 
NATO and Defence  
These arguments do not amount to a case for 
organising territorial defence in an EU context 
instead of NATO, however. First, Europeans 
could keep up the fight against Russia (bolstered 
by their massive economic and demographic 
overweight) but with current capabilities may not 
be able to liberate any conquered territory 
without their North American allies. Second, 
European nuclear capabilities and arrangements 
lag far behind. Third, the UK has of course left 
the EU. Finally, in a world that is dominated by 
continent-sized great powers, Europeans would 
do well to maintain their alliance with one of 
these powers, and even strengthen it – by making 
it more evenly balanced. As long, that is, as 
American Grand Strategy is sufficiently in line 
with the European interest (and if another 
Trumpist president does not fatally damage the 
alliance first).  
 
The first part of the concordat, therefore, is that 
NATO will continue to take the lead in collective 
defence, with the EU in a supporting role. EU 
strategic autonomy, in other words, will not 
extend to planning for territorial defence (even 
though Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European 
Union provides a legal basis for it). That should 
 
 





put the eastern European states at ease.  
 
Within NATO, however, the European Allies 
and Partners who together make up the EU, 
should drastically increase their level of ambition. 
Given the US focus on China, NATO’s “first 
line” of conventional deterrence and defence is in 
fact European already today. The few American 
combat troops that remain in Europe fulfil only 
the classic tripwire function: they are there not to 
halt any invasion, but to ensure the US’ full 
commitment as soon as one of them becomes a 
casualty. The “EU Allies & Partners” need to 
build conventional forces of sufficient strength to 
send a strong message to Russia and any other 
potential adversary: even if there were not a single 
American soldier present in Europe, still nobody 
could win a short and sharp conventional war 
against the Europeans alone. That would greatly 
strengthen conventional deterrence (which is a 
vital complement to nuclear deterrence).  
 
In concrete terms, the only respectable target for 
the “EU Allies & Partners” is that together they 
contribute half of all the conventional capabilities 
that the NATO Defence Planning Process 
(NDPP) requires. While they build that force 
over time, in the short term already the “EU 
Allies & Partners” ought to step up their role in 
Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the 
Baltic states: three of the four multinational 
battlegroups ought to be led by an EU Ally, 
instead of just one.5  
 
The EU, Resilience, and China  
Furthermore, while NATO maintains the lead in 
collective defence against military threats, the EU 
as such must take the lead in building resilience 
against non-military threats. The EU is a single 
market, so any act of coercion or subversion by a 
foreign power against a Member State affects the 
Union as a whole. In many of the geo-economic 
areas that are key to prevent subversion and 
coercion, the EU has either exclusive or shared 
competences with its Member States. When it 
comes to reacting to subversion and coercion, 
diplomatic and economic sanctions are also 
adopted through the EU – few Member States 
will dare confront another power alone. On the 
other hand, not every act of subversion or 
coercion against the EU has an effect on or calls 
for measures from the US and other non-EU 
Allies, while NATO as such has but limited 
instruments in these areas.  
 
NATO should therefore assume a supporting 
role vis-à-vis the EU. It can coordinate, exert peer 
pressure, and propose standards (such as its 
seven baseline requirements on resilience).6 But 
only to the extent that this is reconcilable with 
EU norms and standards (as regards investment 
screening and access to the single market, for 
example). The EU for its part should use the 
mutual assistance guarantee of Article 42.7 to 
build strong solidarity against all non-military 
forms of subversion and coercion, and design a 
common policy on deterrence and retaliation. A 
cyber-attack on one Member State, for example, 
should be responded to as a cyber-attack on all.  
 
On the European side, the EU obviously takes 
the lead on China, because this is primarily a 
foreign policy and not a defence issue. NATO’s 
supporting role should be limited to assessing the 
potential impact of developments in Chinese 
defence on its own defence. The Allies can, of 
course, consult and coordinate all aspects of their 
China policy, just like they can discuss resilience, 
the climate crisis, energy, and migration around 
the NATO table. But that does not mean that 
NATO is best suited to make and implement 
policy on these issues, or that NATO 
Headquarters should add a branch to the curia to 










EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS  
While NATO takes the lead in territorial defence, 
it should abandon its missionary zeal. The second 
part of the concordat is that the EU and its 
Member States assume the lead in expeditionary 
operations, with NATO in the supporting role. 
The focus will naturally be on the southern flank.  
 
The Strategic Compass should provide clarity 
where the 2016 Global Strategy obfuscated: when 
and why should the EU consider intervening in 
the south? Protecting the citizens of other 
countries trapped in conflict can be a positive side 
effect of EU interventions, but not its main 
purpose, as the Global Strategy seemed to 
pretend. In a crisis, the EU should only consider 
direct intervention if its vital interests are directly 
at stake and the states of the region cannot master 
the situation. For example, if a crisis threatens to 
spill over onto EU territory, to sever its 
connectivity, to generate terrorism against the 
EU, or to cause refugee streams towards the EU 
that can only be managed by ending the crisis. If 
this is the case, the EU must be ready to take the 
lead, even in large-scale combat operations. But 
if this is not the case, and unless the UN Security 
Council activates the Responsibility to Protect, 
the EU should limit itself to diplomatic and 
economic instruments of crisis management, and 
indirect military measures, such as enforcing 
sanctions and supporting local and regional 
actors.  
 
The overall long-term objective for the southern 
flank is not to deter aggression against European 
territory or to militarily defeat an adversary. 
Rather, the aim is to build up states that provide 
sufficiently effective and inclusive government to 
gain the support of the majority of their citizens, 
so as to motivate their security and defence forces 
to fight for them, and be able to defeat their 
adversaries themselves. This calls for a 
comprehensive strategy that the EU is best placed 
to design and implement. Within that framework, 
the EU should favour an indirect military 
approach: supporting the states of the region 
through long-term capacity-building, rather than 
assuming executive tasks itself.  
 
The EU’s responsibility for the southern flank 
includes maritime security, which is vital for the 
Union’s connectivity. From the Mediterranean to 
the western half of the Indian Ocean, where 
maritime security is eminently linked to the 
stability of the littoral states, the EU should 
assume the lead, with NATO again in a 
supporting role. Further afield, notably in the 
main Indo-Pacific theatre, neither NATO nor the 
EU but the US has the military lead. Beyond its 
broad southern neighbourhood, the EU’s 
military role is one of supporting EU diplomacy, 
through port visits, combined exercises, 
exchange of officers and cadets and other forms 
of military partnership, as well as Freedom of 
Navigation Operations.  
 
Strategic Direction  
In many southern neighbours, the indirect 
military approach requires a semi-permanent 
presence. For where the EU leaves a void, others 
move in: Russia, China, the Gulf states, and 
indeed Turkey. The EU cannot afford these 
powers to gain a permanent military foothold and 
steer countries in a direction that runs contrary to 
its interests. This demands a delicate balance: 
doing enough to bolster the host state and keep 
other powers at bay, without taking over what 
ought to be the host state’s tasks or being 
instrumentalised by it.  
 
This more geopolitical approach calls for an 
annual regional assessment, that takes into 
account all national, coalition, and UN operations 
in the same theatre in which EU Member States 
are engaged, rather than reviewing and 
prolonging EU operations under the Common 
 
 





Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) one by one 
as is current EU practice. Only if there is full 
transparency about Member States’ intentions, 
can resources be allocated to EU operations, or 
existing operations be “Europeanised”, on a 
rational basis.  
 
Europeans are in the lead already in operations in 
the Sahel, with the US providing support in 
specific areas. The US interest in active 
operations in the Middle East is likely to decline 
as well. For NATO, the southern flank will 
always be a sideshow, in light of the more limited 
role of the military instrument there, and of the 
natural focus of the Alliance’s military 
establishment on Russia. The creation, in 2017, 
of the so-called “Hub for the South”, under 
Allied Joint Force Command Naples, did not 
change that reality. Instead, NATO should create 
a new mechanism to allow the EU, or a coalition 
led by EU Member States, direct and flexible 
access to JFC Naples itself, bypassing the 
moribund Berlin-Plus arrangement (which is 
such a cumbersome delegation that it amounts to 
an abdication).  
 
The EU’s tiny Military Planning and Conduct 
Capacity (MPCC) will never provide the 
backbone in terms of command and control that 
the EU’s expeditionary role demands. Making 
JFC Naples permanently available to the EU will. 
Confident that a headquarters would always be 
on standby, the EU should then task the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS) with permanent 
contingency planning for the southern flank, 
without having to wait for political authorisation 
on a case-by-case basis as today.  
 
The current absence of clarity has been a great 
weakness of the EU: without an internal 
consensus on which expeditionary role it is 
playing or should be playing, the EU has been 
unable to be consistently proactive. 
Fundamentally, taking charge of expeditionary 
operations in the broad neighbourhood is what 
EU Member States decided in 1999 already, when 
they launched what was originally called the 
European Security and Defence Policy. It was not 
controversial then, and should not be 
controversial now, not even if one calls it 
“strategic autonomy”. Twenty-two years later, 
the EU Member States should just finally do it. 
 
DEFENCE PLANNING AND CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT  
Oftentimes competing centres of pilgrimage lay 
claim to the same relics; thus several saints appear 
to have possessed multiple arms and legs, or even 
heads. States really have but a single set of forces 
though, and no miraculous multiplication is 
possible. Yet both NATO and the EU seek to 
guide the development of those forces – the latter 
with even less success than the former. The EU 
Member States meanwhile since more than 
twenty years ritualistically incant that they will 
pool their national defence efforts, but actually 
never do.  
 
The NDPP sets binding targets for every 
individual Ally. But it does not take into account 
the need of the “EU Allies & Partners” for 
strategic enablers for autonomous expeditionary 
operations on the southern flank; today, these 
enablers are very unevenly spread across NATO, 
and are in fact mostly American.7 Nor does the 
NDPP seem to take cognisance of the fact that in 
many areas many European Allies no longer have 
the scale to build significant capabilities in a cost-
effective way. At most, therefore, they could only 
partially meet their targets, and even then in a far 
too costly manner, thus wasting limited 
resources.  
 
On the EU side, the Capability Development 
Plan (CDP), building on the Headline Goal 
Process8 and the findings of the Coordinated 
 
 





Annual Review on Defence (CARD), sets 
collective targets aimed at building an 
autonomous expeditionary capacity, while 
Member States outline their plans to meet their 
commitments under Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) in a National 
Implementation Plan (NIP). But as none of these 
processes is binding, unsurprisingly, their 
influence on national defence planning is 
marginal. Sinning against one’s NDPP targets 
carries with it the penalty of some uncomfortable 
moments during the regular confessionals (or 
self-criticism sessions, to use an image from 
another ideological framework); ignoring the 
CDP not even that.  
 
Since neither the NDPP nor the CDP achieves its 
targets, a major rethink is imperative.  
 
Planning for One Force Package  
The third part of the concordat is that the “EU 
Allies & Partners” adopt a single defence 
planning process geared to a single force package. 
NATO and the EU should interlock their 
defence planning, and the “EU Allies & Partners” 
must use PESCO as the core instrument to build 
a comprehensive full-spectrum force package 
that meets all their needs.  
 
The “EU Allies & Partners” should decide on a 
set of binding collective targets, and integrate them 
in the NDPP in between the national targets and 
the target for NATO as a whole. On the one 
hand, these collective targets should focus on the 
strategic enablers that the “EU Allies & Partners” 
identify through the EU’s Headline Goal Process 
as required for expeditionary operations. On the 
other hand, they must provide for the firepower 
and additional enablers that the “EU Allies & 
Partners” need to strengthen their conventional 
deterrence and defence. The aim is to design the 
capability mix of the “EU Allies & Partners” in 
such a way that within their contribution of half 
of the NATO force posture they have the means 
of undertaking autonomous expeditionary 
operations on the southern flank. Other 
European NATO members, such as Norway, 
could associate themselves with this EU 
dimension within the NDPP.  
 
The “EU Allies & Partners” should meet these 
targets by using PESCO as it was meant: a move 
from cooperation to integration. PESCO today is 
a “mini-European Defence Fund” for a plethora 
of mostly unimportant procurement projects, 
serving to equip national units: its impact will be 
minimal. The Strategic Compass must rectify 
what the PESCO Strategic Review failed to do in 
2020.  
 
The way forward is to turn the existing PESCO 
project of creating a Crisis Response Operation 
Core (CROC) into the core of PESCO as whole, 
and to tailor the other projects to it. This means 
building a modular multinational force package, 
with army brigades (or air force squadrons or 
navy ships) as the national building-blocks but 
with multinational support units, all permanently 
anchored in standing multinational divisions and 
corps. Member States can then launch other 
PESCO projects to fully harmonize the 
equipment of these brigades, and to build the 
strategic enablers to deploy them (to the benefit 
of the EU’s defence industrial base, and with the 
support of the EDF).9   
 
The CROC can become one of the three army 
corps envisaged by NATO planning. It would 
take its place in the line in case of an Article 5 
scenario, while modular formations could be 
readily generated from it for expeditionary 
operations. The CROC should thus comprise 
both heavy armoured formations and more 
rapidly deployable motorised and airmobile 
formations (plus naval and air forces), allowing all 
“EU Allies & Partners” to play a useful part in 
 
 





the domain that best suits them. The key is top-
down guidance, to ensure that all modules 
combined do constitute a comprehensive full-
spectrum force package. That requires a 
strengthening of the institutional framework and 
political ownership on the EU side, notably the 
creation of a Council of Defence Ministers (who 
until now only meet informally).  
 
CONCLUSION 
As the catholic priest explained to the nun: if you 
became pregnant, that would be a mystery; if I 
became pregnant, that would be a miracle. In 
spite of all the obvious drawbacks of the current 
arrangement, it would probably require a miracle 
for an effective EU-NATO concordat to emerge 
from the various conclaves. If it fails to, the 
reasons why will not be a mystery.  
 
One cause would certainly be Greece and Turkey 
shamelessly continuing to abuse their position in 
the EU and NATO to fight out their dispute over 
Cyprus (which really must finally be allowed to 
become one of the “EU Allies & Partners”). One 
must also blame the leading states, on both sides 
of the Atlantic, however, that continue to tolerate 
this situation.  
 
If for this reason the miracle of an actual EU-
NATO concordat does not come to pass, the EU 
could still deliver its part of the bargain and adopt 
an ambitious Strategic Compass that clarifies 
what Member States will do for defence and 
deterrence as well as expeditionary operations – 
and holds them to it.  
 
But there is a more fundamental reason for the 
current stalemate. On the one hand, Atlanticist 
dogmatism refuses to depart in the slightest from 
the scriptures and adapt NATO to the emergence 
of the EU – as if the defence arrangements of the 
1950s were ipso facto suitable for the world of 
today and saying otherwise was blasphemy. On 
the other hand, European mysticism is forever 
preaching that European defence will bring 
salvation, without taking any real steps to bring it 
about. Dogmatism and mysticism are enemies of 
sound strategy, which must be based on reason.  
 
                                    
From his pulpit at Ghent University and the 
Egmont Institute, Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop has 
been pontificating about European defence 
for over two decades, without ever once losing 
faith (which some of his colleagues think is a 
miracle in itself).  
 
The author warmly thanks his co-disciples Jo 
Coelmont, Jolyon Howorth, Tania Latici, 
Thierry Tardy, and various Belgian and other 
European officers and diplomats for their 
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